Much attention has been paid to 'blunders' and 'policy disasters'. Some argue, on the one hand, that the UK's political and administrative system is disproportionately prone to generating disasters, but offer no systematic evidence on the record of failures of policies and major public projects in other political systems. On the other hand, research on cognitive biases and other failures of collective decision-making has developed highly generic frameworks that are used to assess cases of perceived policy failure. Both of these perspectives rely on post-hoc assessments of failure and intentions, often from those actors involved in the process. This paper develops a comparative perspective on 'blunders' in government. It does so by (a) developing theory-driven expectations as to the factors that are said to encourage 'failure', and (b) by devising a systematic framework for the assessment of policy processes and outcomes. The paper applies this novel approach to a set of similar 'failures' in particular domains (i.e. in public buildings, transport infrastructure, IT projects, benefits/tax systems, and aerospace/defence projects) to assess whether different politicaladministrative systems are prone to different kinds of 'blundering' or whether there are universal patterns in the occurrence of costly and avoidable policy mistakes across policy domains.
This is not to say that we dispute the diagnosis of 'failure', 'fiasco' or 'disaster' in any one particular case. We also do not want to appear as apologists for one particular political system over another; however. Instead, the following should therefore be seen as a call for a genuinely comparative analysis of the cases, and therefore identification of particular mechanisms. Whether political systems appear to generate more or less, or particular types of failure is, ultimately, an empirical question.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT BLUNDERING
In the following discussion, we develop four complementary perspectives on governmental and policy 'blundering'. As starting point, we assume that decision-making always takes place under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. In other words, we assume that probabilities of particular events occurring cannot be easily calculated, and neither can their impact. Decision-making processes are characterised by pre-existing norms and worldviews, fluid participation, and strategic and self-interested actors. Furthermore, we assume that most decision-making in government deals with 'wicked issues' (Rittel and Webber 1973) , they are inherently about value trade-offs and multiple contradictory dimensions and objectives. In order to explore different dimensions of blundering we distinguish between sources of blundering on two dimensions. We distinguish between those sources for blundering according to whether a lack of resources or a high degree of resource depletion can be associated with blundering. Furthermore, we can distinguish sources for blundering in terms of whether supposed blunders are caused by the (tragic) choices of individuals, or by actors whose actions are channeled through the inherent characteristics of politico-administrative systems (such as the 'Westminster system'). Table 1 points to these two dimensions and the four resultant sources for policy blundering. We explore each of these four perspectives in more detail below. The four perspectives on blundering point to various reasons as to why policy decisions can go 'wrong'. In the case of hyper-excited politics the source of failure lies in intentional choices by individuals or groups of individuals. This choice is associated with 'moral panics', Pavlovian politics and other external pressures that make politicians and official rush policy announcements only to repent at leisure when these commitments turn out to be counterproductive, more costly than expected, fail to achieve intended outcomes, or generate no interest (see Cohen 1972; 2002; Lodge and Hood 2005; Breyer 2003; Sunstein and Zeckhauser 2011) . Examples include policy over-reactions to perceived risks such as mobile phones or high profile announcements to provide public funding for flood victims which are never taken up. Similarly, the context of iconic or symbolic politics is often associated with hyper-excited blundering (Moran 2001; Jennings 2013) . Politicians (and senior administrators) in the realm of high politics are motivated by the possibility of creating signature projects or legacies (whether this is in terms of buildings, enduring reforms to welfare or tax systems, events or other high-profile projects) and, therefore, are prone to optimism bias in discounting potential disadvantages and costs. Specifically, 'fast-thinking' (Kahneman 2013) by key decision-makers acting under political pressure may make them vulnerable to cognitive biases, such as disproportionately 'locking-on' to particular bits of information (see Jones 1994 for a wider discussion of bounded rationality in policy-making). and 'veto points' has suggested that some political systems are more likely to witness policy reversals than others, and therefore to be more prone to U-turns and other policy inconsistencies (e.g. Weaver and Rockman 1993; Pierson 2001; Tsebelis 2002) . The propensity towards 'strong government' is seen as problematic as it reduces deliberation opportunities and therefore also the information available to decision-makers, as well as failing to check over-enthusiastic and over-confident executives. Elsewhere, Janis (1972) famously notes insularity of collective decision-making as a source of blundering in foreign 2 Note that this view of 'fast' and 'slow' thinking is disputed. In areas of genuine uncertainty, fast thinking (or heuristics) is the superior strategy. It might be argued that the large scale projects represent a large series of loosely coupled and decentralised decisions, made under conditions of ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty). However, initial choices in terms of embarking on a particular mega-project might be seen as somewhat different to genuine choices in uncertainty that might apply to financial meltdowns, natural catastrophes or military invasions, for example.
policy although this insularity was arguably less a result of the constitutional system. While, therefore, majoritarian systems are seen, especially from a British perspective, as problematic, a similar case can be made for consensus systems. Here, the need to bargain and seek consensus is seen as delaying decisions, requiring side-payments and pork-barreling, and slowing down the business of government.
Instrument choice as a source of blundering is associated with explanations that suggest the 'wrong tools for the job' have been chosen for the policy problem or objective in question.
Here blunders are caused, or could be avoided, because an inappropriate or sub-optimal method, such as a regulatory standard or economic incentive (e.g. taxes, subsidies) is chosen to achieve the desired effect. Policy instruments differ in terms of their degree of 'coerciveness ' and 'depletability' (Hood 1983; Hood and Margetts 2007) . For example, using advertising campaigns to change behaviours is somewhat 'cheaper' than extensive policing, backed by a highly punitive enforcement approach. Similarly, the use of highly punitive and visible punishment might not just require the creation of a particular enforcement machinery, but it is also likely to trigger resistance and avoidance, requiring, in turn, further repressive organisational tools. In other words, the less the degree of social acceptance of the chosen policy and its instruments, the more likely it is that there will be extensive gaming and counter-learning (Hood 1976) . Furthermore, the use of long-term fixed contracts, such as in the case of public-private partnerships, may shift the financial burden from current to future generations (something which could interact with cognitive biases, such as the hyperbolic discounting of future costs). Indeed, instrument choice also links to wider organisational features, namely the dispersion of responsibility for particular activities. Hood (1976) has noted problems associated with 'multi-organisational sub-optimisation' --where the activities of multiple organisations across multiple domains are interdependent without necessarily being aware of, or sharing, each other's objectives. Similarly, Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) classic implementation study noted how the 'wrong' instrument, namely one with too many 'clearance points' was inevitably leading to a disappointing policy outcome.
Finally, blunders are often associated with a lack of administrative capacity. Administrative capacity is related to bureaucratic organisation and competence. This factor therefore differs from instruments in that the latter relate to the resource implications of particular modes of policy intervention. Administrative capacity, in contrast, relates to the skills and capabilities that are expected to exist within bureaucracies. In other words, a lack of administrative capacity is defined by the unavailability of relevant and suitable skills within public and private organizations, issues with communication and co-ordination within and across organisations in the design and delivery of policies, and the ability to monitor ongoing policies and projects. Information-gathering, -sharing, and -processing are inherently demanding and resource-intensive, especially in the context of governments' scarce attention (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 2014) . A lack of co-ordination capacity might be said to lie at the heart of failures of collaboration between different government agencies and private and para-public bodies. Co-ordination capacities are also at the heart of problems of 'turf' in government. For example, silos in cross-agency intelligence sharing were identified by the 9/11 Commission as a key factor in the failures that led to the attack on the US on September 11 th . Elsewhere, in the British context, Dunleavy (1994) identifies the loss of institutional memory due to an almost never-ending cycle of administrative restructuring and reform as a major limit on administrative capacity. A lack of administrative capacity might also be linked to a lack of staff in policing certain activities (such as undertaking food inspections).For example, a lack of civil service expertise in procurement is often attributed as a factor in cost overruns in major IT projects and large defence contracts (e.g. Margetts 2012).
More generally, one can distinguish administrative capacity in a variety of types: (i) regulatory, (ii) delivery, (iii) co-ordination, and (iv) analytical (Lodge and Wegrich 2014).
Accordingly, blundering may emerge due to (i) dysfunctional oversight activities, (ii) insufficient resources to engage at the policy frontline, (iii) an inability to bring together and maintain a diverse set of actors, or (iv) failures of imagination due to a lack of technical capacity to process information and forecast trends.
How does this framework for analysis differ from existing studies of blundering governments? The preponderance in the literature places the state and the underlying constitutional framework at the heart of its analysis. For Dunleavy (1994) , for example, the 'fastest law in the West' facilitated the passage of major public sector reforms, therefore, worsening the potential effects of determined decision-making within a more or less vetopoint free context. For Moran (2001; 2003) , the 'incomplete penetration of the regulatory state' logic within the informal logics of the Westminster system has generated its own dysfunctionalities and 'catastrophes'. For King and Crewe (2013) , the constitutional system facilitates rather than hinders over-excited politicians and civil servants. We do not suggest that such reinforcing processes do not matter, but we suggest that in order to establish whether the 'constitution' is to blame, we need to focus on these aspects in more detail, and cross-nationally, in order to understand the nature of hyper-excited politics in nonWestminster systems. We also need to better understand the role of instrument choice, administrative capacity and hyper-excited politics, in order to assess the contributing or enabling role of the constitutional setting of policy blunders.
A METHOD FOR ANALYSIS
How might one approach analysis of the conditions associated with policy disasters? Given that even in apparently blunder-prone settings policy disasters are relatively rare events compared to the usual politics of the mundane, it is necessary to find a way of sampling them.
One option would be to examine the properties of all policies of a given government for a defined period, evaluate which might be considered disastrous against a defined set of criteria and then record the associated set of contributing factors that led to the blunder. This would enable us to consider how blunders differ from the wider population of policies that are less (visibly) problematic. Such an approach would be highly resource intensive, however, since policy disasters make up just a small proportion of the overall population, and because collecting comparable data for all policies would be impractical. to determine whether or not a particular factor is present in the case of a given policy disaster.
For each case, then, we complete the relevant information for each of the quadrants in Table 2 (see below). Having addressed this dichotomous question, we then assign a weight to the variable (taking a value between 0 and 1.0) which provides a subjective evaluation of how significant the factor was in leading to the blunder. This draws upon Ragin's (2000) method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). On the basis of inspection of contemporaneous accounts and subsequent inquiries, this serves to indicate how much each factor contributed to the policy disaster. As we will show, not only does this enable systematic comparison across cases it also enables the identification of multiple permutations of combinations of covariates that are associated with a particular output value. Lack of capacity for subjecting initial budget forecasts to scrutiny.
Government reliant on private firms and industry sectors for delivering/administering policy (e.g. security for major events)
QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWENTY-THREE POLICY
BLUNDERS
As noted, we focus on a range of cases that have attracted the label 'failure' and 'disaster'.
These range from transport infrastructure, defence, IT systems to financial regulation and public buildings. In the following, we do not provide for a blow-by-blow account for each of the individual cases. Rather, we focus solely on the four potential explanations, outlined above. Details of the cases are summarized in the Appendix Table A1 .
Hyper-excited politics
As noted already, hyper-excited politics are associated with media pressure, moral panics or some form of over-enthusiastic commitment towards a particular policy or project. While none of our cases represents a 'Pavlovian' response in the sense of policy (over) Millennium Dome and Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, political keenness to get projects off the ground before designs had been finalised or properly assessed was a factor in cost overruns and subsequent problems experienced in development of the project (in the case of the Dome, which largely came in on budget, it meant that the structure was built with little idea of the exhibition that would eventually fill it). President Mitterrand's ambition to construct a national library as part of a series of 'Grand Projets' across Paris was similarly legacy-driven. Indeed the contract for le Bibliotheque Nationale de France was written in such a way as to ensure no future president could alter the plans (Fitchett 1995) . In addition, the prospect of winning the right to host international mega-events, such as the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games, are often a trigger for hyper-excited politics as bids make overoptimistic forecasts of costs and economic benefits (Preuss 2008; Jennings 2012a; 2012b) . Of our cases, both the London and Montreal Olympics were entangled with high politics and the aspirations of leaders at the national or local level to host grand spectacles. The Sochi 2014
Winter Olympics was similarly conceived as a legacy for President Putin (Hille 2014) and to showcase modern Russia, with costs spiralling to $50 billion. While political enthusiasm might be a factor in the cases included in this study, it does not explain why politicians are able to mobilise support for some bids, but fail to do so for others; such as the decision by the Norwegian city of Oslo to withdraw from the competition to host the 2022 Winter Olympics.
At best, hyper-excited politics in the case of mega-events as well as large-scale technical systems seem to require some encouragement from businesses, sporting authorities or other organised interests. Finally, many policy blunders are linked to policy-makers pursuing legacies that offer a symbolic political statement: such as providing a clear signal that devolution was irreversible through the construction of the Scottish Parliament (Fraser 2004, p. 418) , and the desire of the British and French governments to demonstrate their technological and engineering prowess through the Concord project in the 1960s. The same can be said about the German Transrapid project. This magnetic levitation-based technology was widely promoted as a 'technology of the future' that would also offer export opportunities to German industry, once a German service had been into operation. Eventually, no link was every built in Germany, but the continued political support for such a technologies whose advantages were increasingly reduced by cheaper air-traffic and incremental advances in traditional rail technology points to a degree of hyper-excited politics.
Hyper-excitement might therefore be a critical factor in defining the context in which decisions regarding major projects or policies are taken. This matters for the classic problem of 'optimism bias' (Flyvbjerg et al. 2013) , which can lead to the adoption of risky projects and with the ambitious claims of the Blair government that it would showcase a 'New Britain', did not lead to constructions problems, but arguably set the stage for wider criticism and political embarrassment. Somewhat differently, the desire to make a 'statement' regarding unification and relocation of the German capital to Berlin contributed to the conditions of the long drawn-out construction process of a new airport for Berlin. Indeed, the urge to appear 'modern' by advocating supposedly new public-private partnerships, and deliver a reduced burden for taxpayers, was also at the heart of other contemporary policy disasters, as illustrated in the case of TollCollect. Here, ministers were keen to illustrate their 'modern'
way of policy-making via delegating the development of the toll-collecting systems for road haulage to the private sector. Despite this, the project suffered delays and legal disputes with the contractor. However, this contrasts with an example of eventual abandonment, namely the Transrapid.
Less evidence of hyper-excitement exists when it comes to the long-term defence projects among our cases. The Eurofighter project emerged in the context of the cold war, and was criticised for not reflecting on Glasnost let alone, even after 1989, the collapse of communism. The U-turn regarding the decision on the aircraft/carrier combination for Britain's Carrier Strike project resulted from a new government --seeking to make savings for its austerity programme --overturning a decision by its predecessor, only to later reverse its own decision as costs escalated.
In short, hyper-excited politics do not offer a complete explanation for policy disasters or blunders. Politicians in heat might prefer to engage in funding promises (such as for flood defences) or legislative and regulatory initiatives. However, when it comes to long-term projects, such as the kind of cases that are of interest in this study, hyper-excitement is typically linked to an appetite for making symbolic legacy commitments, presenting high-end technological fixes to supposed problems, and constructing iconic monuments, which leads in turn to over-optimistic statements regarding their viability and limited cost implications. This, in turn, sets the stage for a reluctance to reverse decisions and abandon projects.
Constitutional politics
As noted, one of the standard accusations is that political systems generate their own policy side-effects and dysfunctionalities. Majoritarian systems are said to generate 'fastest laws of the west', while consensus-based system encourage log-rolling and pork-barrels. Whereas
Moran (2003) However, while such a shared mixed system was present in other cases, the basic problem reflected general failure in the oversight capacities of government when it comes to monitoring the activities of those in charge of constructing or operating major projects.
Indeed, a shared characteristic is that projects seem to go 'off budget' mostly due to the complexity of the project management, rather than simply because of lack of political interest. . The key problem in these cases involved the capacity of these arms-length vehicles to manage highly complex processes and to make choices about when to inform political principals about delays and over-runs. The Berlin-Brandenburg airport was initially to be constructed by a private consortium, led by Hochtief. Following a court ruling declaring this initial tendering outcome illegal, the various governments were required to take on responsibility for the overall project, creating a company to manage the construction process.
However, a high degree of contractual complexity across parties, the tendency to develop highly complex technical solutions and a lack of managerial oversight (and evidence of corruption) created the conditions for a policy disaster. The development of the Millennium Dome similarly led British government to create a private company to build and operate the national exhibition. A similar tendency towards complexity was evident in various IT disasters in the UK, for example (in a case not (yet) included in our list), in 2015 the online system of the Rural Payments Agency had to be turned into a paper-only system following technical problems and complaints.
It can also been argued that the case of the West Coast Mainline franchising episode represents an example of instrument failure, with perverse incentives generated by a complex franchising system that meant that the initial winning bid was encouraged to bid on highly optimistic terms with regards of future growth. While this was a convenient excuse (for the Labour party) to campaign for the abandonment of the particular franchising system that was governing the British railways in the 2010s, this particular episode was ultimately more a case of a lack of administrative capacities (see below) as well as about interdependencies with other high profile projects, namely a planned high speed train line. That is, it was alleged that over-optimistic assumptions were copied from the plans of the (troubled) high speed line and used for the franchising process.
More generally, the discretion to choose instruments is often severely constrained, in particular by EU state aid and competition rules. These added constraints and complexity, and therefore further sources for disaster (such as the Berlin-Brandenburg airport). However, it is difficult to suggest the contextual limits on instrument choice were solely 'at fault' for the extent of blundering we observe. Instruments therefore matter in the sense of introducing their own vulnerabilities and complexities; however, it is difficult to suggest that they were, in their own, responsible for generating policy disasters.
Administrative Capacity
As noted above, administrative capacity is associated with a willingness to challenge and scrutinise proposals -and to deliver them. Across all our cases, it can be questioned as to why senior officials and politicians did not ask more probing questions or scrutinize proposals more deeply. If one was to use only critical reports by the National Audit Office (NAO) to explore UK-based disasters, then one would easily get the impression that 'administration' was largely at fault. However, as the remit of the NAO prohibits it from commenting on political choices, one has to probe more deeply into the ways in which a lack of administrative capacity contributed to each blunder, beyond that of an initial political decision. For example, the West Coast Mainline rail franchising disaster was blamed on a lack of administrative capacity (see Public Accounts Select Committee 2013; National Audit Office 2012). Civil servants were suspended, the lack of financial resources to employ consultants was bemoaned, the modelling behind calculations was questioned, and the franchising process was challenged.
The implementation of the Universal Credit scheme to simplify the system for working-age benefits in the UK suffered badly from a high rate of turnover of senior leadership and a lack of IT expertise more generally, along with a 'fortress' mentality among the programme team (NAO 2013). Visitor and ticket sale forecasts for the Dome were also got badly wrong by planners (NAO 2000), while Home Office development of the identity cards scheme spent a substantial amount on contractors because it did not have "certain skill sets and resources necessary for implementation of a large and complex project such as Identity Cards (Public Accounts Select Committee 2006, p. 11). The lack of administrative capacity in these cases should also be seen in the context of a reduced capacity to recruit external expertise, demand by government for 'good news' in a hostile political environment, and the inherent complexity of each of the projects.
Elsewhere, there is evidence of a lack of administrative capacity to stand up to political and interest group pressures, even though resistance to projects was well-informed and present. In the case of the Eurofighter project, the initial advocacy involved a manufacturer that was, at the time, part-owned by the Bavarian government. A lack of resources and a reluctance of government to engage with planners was said to have provided for a 'waving through' response to changes to technical specifications of the project, which led to cost overruns. In light of all this, policy disasters may not just emerge from over-excitably policy-makers but also from failures of resources and expertise in administration, such as in forecasting and project management. Instead, they frequently emerge as a result of weak challenges to planning assumptions and awarding of green lights to complicated and risky projects due to a lack of depth in administrative scrutiny, whether due to political sensitivities, industry pressure, over-enthusiastic project designers or failure to manage disparate sets of agencies and contractors.
More generally, though, none of these projects led to policy disasters simply because 'the state' was in charge. Indeed budget forecasting and project management seems to be problematic for both the public and private sectors. Instead, shortcomings in administrative capacity were often down to a lack of interest and engagement by oversight boards, senior leadership, project teams and individual officials that structured problems experienced with these large projects. One may therefore suggest that administrative capacity presents a generic constraint in contrast to an argument that would claim that some types of systems are more prone than others, due to, for example, extensive managerialist reforms.
If we summarise our qualitative assessment of the causal importance of each of these four sources of blundering, as presented in Table 3 , it is apparent that some factors are far more recurrent and impactful than others. Here we employ a fuzzy set approach (Ragin 2000), assigning each factor a score for the degree to which it is considered to be a contributing or critical factor to the policy blunder. The sets take values of 0.0 (not a contributing factor at all or not event present in the case), 0.1 (a minor factor), 0.3 (not that important, but played a role), 0.5 (one of the main contributing factors, but in itself not critical), 0.7 (a significant cause of the blunder, but exacerbated by presence of one or more other conditions, even minor), 0.9 (the predominant underlying single or conjoint cause of failure), and 1.0 (indisputably the critical and major factor in the blunder, with all other factors incidental).
From inspection of the average score for each factor we see that constitutional politics lags behind substantially (at 0.3), compared with instrument choice (0.5) and hyper-excited politics (0.6) and administrative capacity (0.6). If we simply correlate the fuzzy set score against the severity of the blunder (as shown if the first column) we see that the correlation is much higher for instrument choice (0.6) compared to all other factors (0.2). We might therefore reflect on difference between the degree of causal contribution of a factor and its impact on the severity of the blunder.
Conclusion
Our study featured projects that shared one common feature, namely a high reversal cost. This reversal cost could either be seen in terms of project abandonment or in terms of political cost. Such a common feature may contrast our study with other episodes of 'disaster'.
However, there are nevertheless some broader insights that emerge from our analysis. One is that constitutional politics do not seem to matter, at least not in the ways emphasised by the single country literature. That is, different political systems resorted to highly complex technical fixes, they were attracted by mega-events, and they were prone to cost and time overruns. This suggests that the widespread criticism regarding the British political system (or any other) in terms of being blunderprone requires further consideration.
A further insight is that our study pointed to elements of hyper-excited politics, but less in the sense of moral panics and over-excitable politicians reacting to problems on the fly than systems being open to the temptation of engaging in iconic and legacy politics. This means that the pull of a high prestige building, or a technological fix that would not resolve domestic issues, but could also be exportable, was a wide-spread feature. Failure due to attempts at reputational and prestige policy wins features commonly across systems, but especially so in the German cases. In addition, those projects that reflect particularly prominent 'solutions hunting for problems' (usually involving law and order, such as 'welfare abuse') seem open to policy disasters, as solutions become the end rather than the means in policy-making.
However, we do not find that particular instruments are prone to failures, as we observe different organisational forms, with both state and industry-led projects in our sample.
In other words our study suggests, first of all, that blundering is not an inherently systemspecific feature, but one that recurs across systems. This suggests an element of active choice or agency. This agency is, in turn, met by the inherent limits of administration whose capacities are outgunned when faced with complexities and ambiguities of the kind of projects and policies discussed in this paper. Blaming national characteristics for blunders and failures may therefore offer support to calls for constitutional reform, whittling down of the state and outsourcing of its functions, and further denude politicians at the same time as absolving them from making choices. However, our cross-national study suggests that such an argument makes for poor and unsupported empirical analysis. 
APPENDIX
Cost overrun of 1,000%, completed three years late.
Political desire to fast track the project. Experience in 1970s of halted devolution led to 'lockin' of the project. Symbolic importance of new parliament led to preference for 'quality over cost' in planning. Rush to deliver the project led to an under-estimation of risk. Overoptimistic estimation of the cost on incomplete information.
[0.7]
Newly established system of devolved government in Scotland.
[0.1]
Publicly financed, contractors secured through tendering process, a joint venture between EMBT and RMJM Ltd. Once decision was taken to build a subterranean highway (central artery/tunnel) for Boston's road infrastructure system, the project was irreversible. The Big Dig was a highly technically challenging infrastructure project. Problems with the tunnel such as leaks and structural fissures.
[0.9]
Discovered that leaks were due to poor construction standards by contractors. Legal dispute with the contractors over the construction quality, cost overruns and safety violations (led to payout of around $450 million).
[0 Cost overrun of just 4% on the project, but 57% increase in public cost; major political fiasco (Opening Night left journalists and VIPs waiting in the cold for hours at Stratford station -'could not have gone worse without loss of life'); difficulty in finding a commercial buyer for the venue; highly negative media coverage.
Tony Blair considered it the 'first paragraph' of his reelection manifesto, overriding majority of opposition from Cabinet.
Decision taken in Cabinet at instigation of the Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister ensured Cabinet backing).
Transition between Major and Labour governments caused problems with project development (created high level of uncertainty in developing plans for millennium exhibition).
The New Millennium Experience Company (NMEC), financed through Millennium Commission grants and commercial revenues from ticket sales and sponsors.
[0.5] Shortfalls against expected revenue from ticket sales and sponsorship.
Additional grants from the Millennium Commission to keep the project afloat exceeded the cost of cancellation.
[0 Choice of a universal integrated system involved substantial scale and complexity. In development of the programme, discovered that some new IT systems were unable to be integrated with the new digital system for Universal Credit.
Concerns raised that the new system is unable to handle changes in circumstances and complicated cases, so these will have to be processed manually.
"Throughout the programme the Department has lacked a detailed view of how Universal
Credit is meant to work." (NAO 2013, p.8) .
The senior leadership of Universal Credit experienced a high rate of turnover, while more generally "lacked IT expertise" (NAO 2013, p. 35) . The DWP was criticized by the National Audit Office of having a "good news" reporting culture and operating under a "fortress mentality". National Identity Card Scheme (2002 Scheme ( -2010 , UK Severity = 0.7
Scheme scrapped in May 2010, having cost an estimated £4.5 billion during its lifetime, never having been fully rolled out.
Plans for an identity card scheme announced by the Home Secretary in July 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and increased concern over the threat of terrorism.
Political pressures resulted in changes in project scope: "changing focus has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the likely technology requirements" (PASC 2006. 19 
